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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIM RINDERKNECHT, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ! 
vs. 1 
LANCE LUCK, 
Defendant-Appellee. ] 
» Case No. 970343-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred by-
virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in its application of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-201(3)(b) as the basis for its Ruling and Judgment granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
Did the court err in finding that a contract had not been 
admitted to by Defendant in light of the meaning and intent of Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3) (b) ? 
Did the trial court's err in its granting of Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals reviews th3 trial court's interpretation 
and application of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3) (b) , which poses a 
question of law, for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497, 499 
(Utah 1989); Asay v. Watkins. 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's finding that 
Luck did not admit the existence of a contract "for clear error, 
reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if [it] otherwise reach[es] a firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. ProMax Development v. Mattson, 322 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 
786 (Utah 1988); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P. 2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) . 
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's dismissal of 
Rinderknecht' s complaint for correctness, giving no deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions. First Sec. Bank of Utah v. 
Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201, and specifically, Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) . 
2. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and specifically, 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a Ruling rendered April 4, 1997 and a 
Judgment on Lance Luck's Motion for Summary Judgment rendered May 
7, 1997 in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, 
Roosevelt Department, State of Utah. The Judgment summarily 
dismissed Kim Rinderknecht's complaint. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff-Appellant (Rinderknecht) filed a Complaint on 
October 22, 1996, alleging breach of a oral contract for the 
purchase and sale of cattle. (R. 1-5). Defendant-Appellee (Luck) 
filed an Answer on November 20, 1996, wherein he asserted statute 
of frauds. (R. 22). 
Luck filed a motion for summary judgment on February 7, 1997, 
(R. 27), along with a memorandum, (R. 30), and an affidavit, (R. 
36) . Rinderknecht filed memorandum in opposition to Luck's motion 
on February 25, 1997, (R. 45), along with an affidavit, (R. 42). 
Luck filed a reply memorandum on March 6, 1997, (R. 59). 
The lower court issued its ruling on April 4, 1997, (R. 78), 
and entered its judgment based thereon on May 7, 1997, (R. 81). 
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C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court issued a ruling granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 78-
80). In its ruling, the Court stated as follows: 
The court has reviewed all of [Defendant's] pleading in 
this case, including his affidavit, and finds that [Defendant] 
has not admitted the existence of a contract. It is true, as 
[Plaintiff] notes, that the pleadings exception to the statute 
of frauds will never be applicable against a contesting 
defendant who is well versed in the law (or who has an 
attorney who is so versed) . The pleading exception is 
designed to fulfill the expectation of merchants who are 
either not versed in the law or who are too honest to deny the 
existence of an unwritten contract. However, the purpose of 
the statute of frauds is frustrated if raising the defense is 
treated as an admission that a verbal contract exists. 
(R. 79). 
The trial court signed its Judgment on April 28, 1997 and 
filed it May 7, 1997, wherein the Court stated the following: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the Statute of Frauds 
found in Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-2-201. Plaintiff's 
reliance on an exception to the Statute of Frauds found in 
70A-2-201(3) is misplaced. The Court has reviewed all of 
Defendant's pleadings in this matter, including Defendant's 
Affidavit and finds that Defendant has not admitted the 
existence of a contract. 
(R. 81-82) . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant stated in paragraph 3 of his affidavit is support of 
his motion for summary judgment as follows: 
On or about July 11, 1996, I had a telephone 
conversation with Plaintiff Kim Rinderknecht 
during which I offered to sell him 240 head of 
cattle (steers and h e i f e r s ) . . . . The sales 
price was 58 cents ($0.58) per pound for 
steers and 52 cents ($0.52) per pound for 
heifers. 
(R. 36-37) . Defendant also stated the above in his memorandum 
supporting summary judgment. (R. 31). 
Defendant states in paragraph 4 of his affidavit and paragraph 
2. of the relevant facts attached to his memorandum supporting 
motion for summary judgment as follows: 
Plaintiff proposed to pay $7,200.00 as a 
deposit, with the balance of the sales price 
being paid upon completion of the contract, or 
the delivery of the cattle. 
(R. 37 and R. 31). 
Defendant further states in his affidavit that he had not 
received the deposit check or written contract as of August 1, 
1996. So he called Plaintiff on that day to discuss Plaintiff's 
intentions. According to Defendant's Affidavit, Plaintiff 
indicated that Defendant would receive the check and written 
contract within a few days. (R. 37) . The above is also stated in 
defendant's memorandum supporting motion for summary judgment. (R. 
31) . 
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Defendant states that as of August 20, 1996, he had still not 
received the deposit check and written contract. So he called 
Plaintiff again on that date. He could not reach the Plaintiff. 
So he sold the cattle elsewhere. (R. 37). 
Defendant states in paragraph 6 of his statement of Relevant 
Facts in his memorandum supporting summary judgment that he sold 
the cattle at a price less than the "contract price with 
Plaintiff." (R. 32). 
Plaintiff states in his affidavit that on July 11, 1996, the 
telephone conversation as presented in Defendant's affidavit did in 
fact occur. (R. 14) . Plaintiff further states that on that same 
day he mailed a deposit check and written memorandum of the 
agreement. (R. 14). Plaintiff also states that on that same day 
he also entered into a similar agreement on the telephone to sell 
the same cattle to a feedlot in reliance on the agreement with 
Defendant. (R. 14-15). 
Plaintiff states in his affidavit that the first telephone 
conversation between the parties following the July 11, 1996 
telephone conversation occurred several days later. (R. 14 and R. 
43) . Plaintiff further states that the Plaintiff offered to hand 
deliver the check and written contract to Defendant but Defendant 
said that would not be necessary, and that he, the Defendant, would 
call Plaintiff in a day or two if he still had not received the 
6 
check. (R. 15 and R. 43). 
Plaintiff denies that Defendant attempted to reach him at any 
time following the telephone conversation near the end of July 
1996. (R. 15 and R. 43-44) . Plaintiff states that he has, and did 
have at that time, an answering machine on his telephone as is 
always reachable. (R. 43). 
Plaintiff was contractually committed to fulfill his 
obligation under the agreement with the feedlot and sustained 
damages as a result. (R. 4-5). 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant on November 4, 
1996, alleging breach of contract. (R. 1-10). 
On January 31, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 27-29). 
On March 27, 1997, the Eighth Judicial District Courc of 
Duchesne County, State of Utah, Roosevelt Department, issued a 
ruling granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 78-80). In its ruling, the 
Court stated as follows: 
The court has reviewed all of [Defendant's] pleading in 
this case, including his affidavit, and finds that [Defendant] 
has not admitted the existence of a contract. It is true, as 
[Plaintiff] notes, that the pleadings exception to the statute 
of frauds will never be applicable against a contesting 
defendant who is well versed in the law (or who has an 
attorney who is so versed). The pleading exception is 
designed to fulfill the expectation of merchants who are 
either not versed in the law or who are too honest to deny the 
existence of an unwritten contract. However, the purpose of 
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the statute of frauds is frustrated if raising the defense is 
treated as an admission that a verbal contract exists. 
(R. 79) . 
The Court signed its Judgment on April 28, 1997 and filed it 
May 7, 1997, wherein the Court stated the following: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the Statute of Frauds 
found in Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-2-201. Plaintiff's 
reliance on an exception to the Statute of Frauds found in 
70A-2-201(3) is misplaced. The Court has reviewed all of 
Defendant's pleadings in this matter, including Defendant's 
Affidavit and finds that Defendant has not admitted the 
existence of a contract. 
(R. 81-82) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's Ruling and Judgment granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was based on an error in the Court's 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (3) (b) . The weight of 
legal authority is clearly contrary to basis upon which the trial 
court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. 
The court was in error in finding that a contract had not been 
admitted to by Defendant within the meaning and intent of Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) . 
The trial court's granting of Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment was an error as a matter of law because genuine issues of 
material fact exist. The weight of legal authority suggests that, 
in light of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (3) (b) and UCC § 2-201(3) (b) , 
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and in light of the meaning and intent of these statutory 
provisions, summary dismissal of a complaint upon the basis of the 
Statute of Frauds is never appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court's Ruling and Judgment granting Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment was based on an error in the Court's 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3) (b) . 
The standard of review applied to the trial court's 
interpretation of statutes which pose question of law is for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989); Asay 
v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) (UCC § 2-201(3) (b) ) states as 
follows: 
A contract: which does not satisfy the 
requirements of Subsection (1) but which is 
valid in other respects is enforceable if the 
party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise 
in court chat a contract for sale was made, 
but the contract is not enforceable under this 
provision beyond the quantity of the goods 
admitted . . . . 
The only published Utah case that Appellant has found that has 
considered the application of the above statute is the case of Lish 
v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976). In Lish, the facts state 
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that the Plaintiff and Defendant had a discussion on the telephone 
regarding the sale of 15,000 bushels of wheat. Plaintiff claimed 
that the terms were agreed to over the telephone. Approximately 
two weeks after the telephone conversation, Plaintiff mailed to 
Defendant a written confirmation of the telephone call. Defendant 
later sold his wheat to someone else. Plaintiff sued for breach of 
a verbal contract. Defendant acknowledged in Court that had he 
received the written confirmation within a more reasonable time, he 
would have considered himself "bound thereby." The Plaintiff took 
the position that this acknowledgment by the Defendant had the 
effect of excepting this transaction from the statute of frauds 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) . However, the Court 
held that the acknowledgment of the Defendant was merely a 
hypothetical statement and did not constitute an admission as to 
the existence of a contract. The Court further noted that fl[t]he 
fact appears to be that neither in his pleading nor otherwise did 
the Defendant acknowledge that there was a valid and binding 
contract." The Court thus ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
201(3) (b) did not apply to except this transaction from the statute 
of frauds. 
Legal authorities have cited the Lish case for the proposition 
that a hypothetical statement does not constitute an admission as 
to the existence of a contract for purposes of UCC § 2-201(3) (b) . 
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Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Construction and Application of UCC 
§ 2-201(3)(b) Rendering Contract of Sale Enforceable 
notwithstanding Statute of Frauds, to extent it is Admitted in 
Pleading, Testimony, or otherwise in Court, 88 A.L.R.3d 416, 427 
(1978); 67 Am. Jur. 2d, Sales § 204. The Lish Case is 
distinguishable from this case in that there is no indication in 
Lish that the Defendant admitted to anything aside from the fact 
that a telephone conversation occurred and there is no hypothetical 
statements in this case. 
If Lish is applied as legal authority for the proposition that 
there was no admission in this case or that the Defendant must 
admit in explicit terms the existence of a valid and binding 
contract, first, it is not likely that such a case will ever happen 
and there is, therefore, no purpose for UCC § 2-201(3) (b), and 
second, it will be against the overwhelming majority of the case 
law of the other jurisdictions. See generally, Travers, supra 88 
A.L.R.3d 416. However, the court in this matter, in ruling that 
there was no admission and in declaring the alleged contract barred 
by the statute of limitations, clearly applied Lish for the 
proposition that, in order for UCC § 2-201 (3Mb) to apply, the 
defendant would have had to admit not only explicit terms of a 
contract but explicitly that in his opinion it is legal and binding 
and that the statute of frauds does not apply because of UCC § 2-
11 
201(3) (b) . Based on the following authorities, and on the 
previously cited A.L.R. and Am. Jur. discussions, it is clear that 
the Court in this case applied the statute in error. 
In Ouaney v. Tobyne, 689 P.2d 844 (Kansas 1984), the 
Plaintiff, a rancher, sued the Defendant, a feed lot operator, for 
breach of an oral contract to purchase cattle. In Defendant's in-
court testimony, he stated (1) he was to purchase 285 steers at 65 
cents per pound, (2) he was satisfied with of quality of the 
steers, (3) the steers were to be weighed at a specified place, (4) 
the loading date would be around October 1, 1982, and (5) he would 
make a down payment of $8,000. At trial, the defendant admitted to 
further conduct which suggested that he recognized the existence of 
a contract although he did not explicitly admit that the contract 
was legal and binding. 
In applying UCC § 2-201(3) (b) , the Kansas Supreme Court in 
Ouaney stated the following: 
In the case now before us, we are required to consider 
the "admission" made by the defendant, Lowell Tobyne, in 
the course of the litigation. This requires us to 
consider any admissions made in his pleadings, testimony, 
or otherwise in court to the effect that a contract for 
sale was made. 
Id. at 849. Summarizing 88 A.L.R. 3d 416 the Kansas court also 
stated as follows: 
It has been stated by the courts that the purposes of 
[UCC 2-201(3) (b) ] are (1) to provide that a party cannot 
admit the existence of an oral contract for the sale of 
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goods and simultaneously claim the benefit of the statute 
of frauds, (2) to prevent the statute of frauds from 
becoming an ai.d to fraud, and (3) to expand the 
exceptions to the nonenforceability of oral contracts 
under the statute of frauds. 
In determining what constitutes an admission under UCC 2-
201(3)(b) the Kansas court in Ouaney went through a rather lengthy 
discussion and began by citing Lewis v. Hughes, 346 A. 2d 231 (Md. 
1975) (a case involving the breach of an oral contract for the 
purchase of a mobile home) as " [a] leading case in this area." The 
court in Lewis held the following which was quoted by the court in 
Ouaney: 
Statute of frauds is satisfied . . . when the party 
denying the existence of the contract and relying on the 
statute takes the stand and, without admitting explicitly 
that a contract was made, testifies to facts which as a 
matter of law establish that a contract was formed. 
Ouaney, 689 P. 2d at 849. The court in Ouaney also cited 
Dancrerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1974) (a case involving 
the breach of an oral contract for the sale of potatoes) for the 
proposition "that the parties against whom an oral contract is 
sought to be enforced need not admit there is a contract or admit 
the contract in the exact terms claimed" and for the proposition 
that "if a fair consideration of the party's testimony, and its 
implications under the circumstances established by the record, 
establishes the claimed agreement, it will be enforced." Ouaney, 
689 P.2d at 849. 
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The court in Ouaney also cited Cargill Inc., Commodity 
Marketing Div. v. Hale, 537 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (a case 
involving the breach of an oral contract for sale of soybeans) . 
The Court in Cargill found that the following exchange upon cross-
examination was sufficient to establish defendant's admission under 
UCC § 2-201(3) (b) even though defendant denied that there had been 
a meeting of the minds: 
Q. Didn't you agree to sell these beans to [plaintiff's 
manager] over the phone for a certain price? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Cargill, 537 S.W.2d at 669. 
Regarding the question of what constitutes an admission, the 
court in Ouaney also quoted 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 
2-201:216, pp. 116-117 (3rd ed. 1982) as follows: 
There is an admission for the purpose of UCC § 2-201(3) 
when there is a manifestation that fairly communicates 
the concept that the party has admitted the existence of 
the contract. It is not necessary that there be an 
express declaration that the party "admits" the making of 
an oral "contract." It is sufficient that his words or 
conduct reasonably lead to that conclusion. 
When a party admits facts the legal consequence of which 
is that there is a contract, it is to be concluded that 
there has been an admission of the existence of the 
contract. The fact that the party does not appreciate or 
understand that the subsidiary facts admitted by him have 
the effect of creating a contract or that he is unwilling 
to state that they did does not negate the fact that a 
"contract" has been admitted. On this basis, it has been 
held that there is an "admission" so as to take an oral 
contact out of the statute of frauds when the party 
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denying the existence of a contract and pleading the 
statute of frauds testifies to facts from which it can be 
concluded that a contract had been formed, even though he 
does not expressly admit that a contract was formed. 
Ouaney. 689 P.2d at 850. 
Ouaney also quoted 2 Williston on Sales, § 14-9, p. 306 (4th 
ed. 1974) as follows: 
The mere fact that a party has, by pleading, testimony or 
otherwise in court admitted to the existence of a 
contract does not mean that it is an admission of every 
individual term of the contract between the parties. Of 
course, if the party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits to the terms of the contracts seriatum, it would 
be extremely difficult to visualize a situation where the 
trier of facts would not find that an oral agreement 
between the parties had not in fact taken place. 
Ouaney, 689 P.2d at 850. 
Finally, the court in Ouaney held as follows: 
From our analysis of this testimony, we have concluded 
that, although the defendant did not openly and frankly 
admit to an oral agreement, his testimony sufficiently 
establishes that an oral agreement existed. The 
defendant acknowledged all the principal terms of the 
agreement. The parties had agreed on a price per pound, 
type and quality of the cattle, place of loading, place 
of weighing, and the down payment. Although the 
defendant never paid the down payment or drew up a 
written contract as he volunteered to do, we hold that 
his testimony contained admissions of his statements and 
actions sufficient to satisfy the requirements of [UCC § 
2-201(3) (b)] . 
Id. at 852. 
The following cases also include similar analyses and similar 
holdings based on similar facts: Hale v. Higginbotham, 188 S.E.2d 
515 (Ga. 1972)(involving breach of oral contract for sale of milk 
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base) ; Quad County Grain, Inc. v. Poe, 202 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 
1972) (involving breach of oral contract for sale of corn) ; and, 
URSA Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Trent. 374 N.E.2d 1123 (111. App. 
Ct. 1978) (involving breach of oral contract for sale of soybeans) . 
The North Dakota Supreme Court rereviewed the Dangerfield case 
on a second appeal a quoted the official comment on UCC § 2-
201(3)(b) as follows: 
If the making of a contract is admitted in court, either 
in a written pleading, by stipulation or by oral 
statement before court, not addition writing is necessary 
for protection against fraud. Under this section it is 
not longer possible to admit the contract in court and 
still treat the Statute as a defense. However, the 
contract is not thus conclusively established. The 
admission so made by a party is itself evidential against 
him of the truth of the facts so admitted and of nothing 
more; as against the other party, it is not evidential at 
all. 
Dancrerfield v. Markel, 252 N.W.2d 184, 189 (N.D. 1977). The court 
in this Dangerfield opinion also quoted 3 Bender's Uniform 
Commercial Code Service, Duesenberg & King, Sales and Bulk 
Transfers, § 2.04[3], pp. 2-80, 2-81 as follows: 
The theoretical justification for the Code rule, which 
explicitly extends to testimony as well a pleading, is 
that a voluntary admission of the existence of a contract 
should result in loss of the statute as a defense. The 
statute should not be used to perpetrate frauds, and if 
under oath the existence of a contract is admitted, the 
use of the statute should thereupon be denied. The 
effect of the rule is that it allows the party asserting 
the contract to present his oral evidence in proof of its 
existence. 
Dangerfield, 252 N.W.2d at 190. The Dangerfield court also quoted 
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enlightening language out of the opinion in Kohlmeyer & Company v. 
Bowen, 192 S.E.2d 400, 405 (Ga. 1972) (a case involving the 
application of a UCC provision almost identical to UCC § 2-
201(3) (b) but dealing with the sale of securities), as follows: 
[T]here is no requirement that defendant admit the entire 
terms of the contract as contended for by the plaintiff 
but only that he admit a contract of sale of a state 
quantity of described securities at a defined or stated 
price. This is sufficient to take the parol contract out 
of the statute so that it can be proven and enforced as 
proven. 
Based on the above authorities, the Court's ruling and 
judgment in this case as quoted above applied the law in error. 
II. The court was in error in finding that a contract had not been 
admitted to by Defendant within the meaning and intent of Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-20K3) (b) . 
The Court of Appeals reviews "the trial court's findings of 
fact for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, or if [it] otherwise reach [es] a 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. ProMax Development v. 
Mattson, 322 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). See State 
v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The trial court clearly erred in finding that the defendant in 
this case did not admit to the existence of a contract within the 
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meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-20M3) (b) . 
Ill. The trial court's granting of Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment was an error as a matter of law because genuine issues of 
material fact exist and because summary judgment is inappropriate 
in light of the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-
201(3) (b) . 
This Court has stated as follows: 
Recognizing that the party adversely affected by the 
summary judgment has not had an opportunity for trial, 
the court views the facts in the light most favorable to 
that party. 
Estate Landscape v. Mountain State Telephone, 793 P.2d 415 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). See also V-l Oil Company v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 323 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (Utah 1997) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows: 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) ; Allen v. Ortezf 802 P.2d 1307, 
1309 (Utah 1990). 
This Utah Supreme Court has stated the following as the 
standard for review of the trial court's dismissal via summary 
judgment: 
We review a summary judgment for correctness, affording 
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993). 
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According the following quoted line of cases under UCC § 2-
201(3) (b), the meaning and intent of UCC § 2-201(3) (b) is that 
summary judgment on the ground that the alleged contract is barred 
or unenforceable is never appropriate by the clear language of the 
statute. Again, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (3) (b) states in 
pertinent part as follows: 
A contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of Subsection (1) but which is 
valid in other respects is enforceable if the 
party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise 
in court that a contract for sale was made, . 
(emphasis added). This statute contemplates that there will be 
more than a summary dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaint before 
the statute of frauds is applied to bar enforcement of a oral 
contract. Therefore, assuming that the court was proper in 
determining that the Defendant did not admit to the existence of a 
contract in his affidavit, summary judgment was still improper. 
Because of the affidavit, there remains many questions regarding 
the telephone conversation of July 11, 1996, regarding the parties' 
conduct following the telephone conversation, and regarding the 
parties' prior course of dealing with each other, with others, and 
the general course of dealing between cattle traders and ranchers. 
There certainly remains questions about whether or not there was an 
oral contract between the parties and whether or not defendant will 
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further admit to the existence of the contract through discovery 
and in court testimony. 
Again, the official comment on UCC § 2-201(3)(b) states as 
follows: 
If the making of a contract is admitted in court, either 
in a written pleading, by stipulation or by oral 
statement before court, not addition writing is necessary 
for protection against fraud. 
Thus the purpose of the statute is frustrated if the complaint to 
enforce an oral contract is summarily dismissed. The Court of 
Appeals of Georgia follow this line of reasoning in Garrison v. 
Piatt, 147 S.E.2d 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). The Garrison Court 
reversed a demurrer to a petition alleging breach of a oral 
contract for sale of a trailer on the ground that the granting of 
a demurrer is contrary to the intent of UCC § 2-201(3) (b). The 
court stated as follows: 
Since a contract, which is within the statute at the time 
of filing the petition or cross action, can become 
enforceable by admission only in the case itself by the 
party charged, rather than admissions made outside the 
case prior to the filing of the petition or cross action, 
it would therefore, be contrary to the intention and 
purpose of the statutory change to permit the sustaining 
of a demurrer to a petition or cross action upon such a 
contract based on the ground that such petition or cross 
action shows upon its face that the contract is within 
the statute of frauds when it may become enforceable by 
acts occurring after the petition or cross action is 
filed. If a demurrer on this ground should be sustained 
to the petition, the plaintiff is denied his opportunity 
of determining on a trial whether the making of the 
contract would be admitted and thus made enforceable for 
the first time. By these changes in the statute of 
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frauds, it is clearly the intent of the legislature that 
the enforceability of a contract, which on its face may 
be within the statute, is tested by the answer, testimony 
or plea of the party charged, and not merely by the 
allegations in the petition or cross action brought to 
enforce the contract. It follows, therefore, that a 
petition upon such a contract which is valid in other 
respects is not demurrable because it shows on its face 
that it is within the statute of frauds. 
Id. at 375. 
In the case of M & W Farm Serv. Co. v. Callison, 285 N.W.2d 
271 (Iowa 1979) , a case involving the breach of a oral contract for 
the purchase of LP gas tanks, the Iowa Supreme Court stated the 
following: 
M & W's key assertion is that Callison7s claims against 
M & W are based on the contract which the pleadings 
indisputably reveal was unwritten and therefore 
unenforceable. In its view, any controverted facts 
relating to the alleged oral contract are immaterial 
because of the contract's unenforceability. Hence, it 
contends that an adjudication by trial court was 
appropriately based on the undisputed material facts. 
What these assertions ignore is that the remaining 
disputed facts raise the possible applicability of a 
least two exemptions from the UCC Statute of Frauds. 
Id. at 274. The court further stated as follows: 
By ruling that the Statute of Frauds rendered 
unenforceable Callison's alleged oral agreement for the 
rental of tanks, trial court foreclosed Callison from the 
opportunity of eliciting an admission by M & W of the 
contract in court, on cross-examination or otherwise. He 
was denied the right implied by [UCC § 2-201(3) (b)] to 
prove the applicability of an exception to the UCC 
Statute of Frauds through events which might yet occur in 
court. 
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. . . [T] he Statute of Frauds . . . may not be raised by 
a motion to dismiss. . . . [T]he Statute of Frauds is 
simply a rule of evidence, which governs only the manner 
of proving a contract, not its validity. Thus, the party 
resisting the Statute should be given the opportunity to 
prove the alleged contract in two statutorily recognized 
ways: by the opposing party's failure to deny the 
existence of the contract in its responsive pleading and 
by the opposing party's emitting oral evidence of the 
contract. 
Id. at 275. 
In Reissman International Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products, Inc., 
10 UCCRS 1165 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972), the New York court denied a 
motion for summary judgment in a case involving the sale of wood 
cabinets upon the basis that a summary judgment is inappropriate in 
light of UCC § 2-201(3)(b). The court stated as follows: 
Whether or not plaintiff may, through the use of 
discovery proceedings after answer obtain a testimonial 
admission of the alleged contract from defendant has not 
yet been passed upon in New York. This court concludes 
that it may . . . . 
"The statute was not designed to protect a party who made 
an oral contract, but rather to aid a party who did not 
make a contract, though one is claimed to have been 
orally made for him." 
This motion was brought on prior to any discovery 
proceedings. The possibility exists that plaintiff there 
or on trial may be able to obtain an admission by 
defendant of the entire contract as claimed. 
Id. at 1167-1168. (cites omitted). 
In light of the above authorities, if it were the intent of 
UCC § 2-201(3) (b) that a complaint alleging an oral contract which 
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on its face is within the statute of frauds may be summarily 
dismissed, which is what happened in this case, then the 
application of UCC § 2-201(3) (b) can always be avoided with a 
summary judgment. However, this is clearly not the intent of the 
statute and the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for 
summary judgment was in error. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant respectfully urges this court to reverse the 
Judgment granted below and instruct the lower court to find that a 
contract has been admitted, that the statute of frauds defense may 
not be considered, and remand the matter for trial on the remaining 
issues. 
DATED this of August, 1997. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-201 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
C. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
D. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
E. Reissman International Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products, 
Inc.. 10 UCCRS 1165 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) 
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SALES 70A-2-201 
{hereto but not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract 
lor the sale of goods within this chapter whether the subject mat ter is to be 
severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms par t of the realty at 
the time of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present 
sale before severance. 
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third-party l ights 
provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be 
executed and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and shall 
then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract 
for sale. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, g 2-107; 1977, 
ch . 272, $ 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ftand and gravel. by the UCC. Salt Lake City Corp. v Kasler 
A contract to provide sand, gravel, and aggre- Corp . 855 F Supp 1560 (D. Utah 199 1) 
g.tie is a contract for the sale of goods, governed 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 77A C.J S. Sales § 15. 
PART 2 
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF 
CONTRACT 
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of 
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not 
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the 
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quanti ty of goods 
shown in such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation 
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party 
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of 
Subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its 
contents is given within ten days after it is received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection (1) but 
which is valid in other respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are 
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business 
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circum-
stances which reasonably indicate tha t the goods are for the buyer, has 
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments 
for their procurement; or 
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(b) if the par ty against whom enforcement is sought admits in his 
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court tha t a contract for sale was 
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the 
quantity of goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and 
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606). 
His to ry : L. 1965, c h . 154, § 2-201. 
C ros s -Re fe r ences . — Price payable in 
money, goods, realtv. or otherwise, § 70A-2-
304. 
ANALYSIS 
Acceptance and receipt of goods. 
Admission of contract's existence. 
Application. 
"Between merchants" exception. 
Confirmatory memorandum. 
Contract for work. 
Definitions. 
Modification of contract. 
Part performance. 
Pleading statute. 
Proving nature of agreement. 
Purpose. 
Requirements. 
Stock transactions. 
Sufficiency of memorandum or writing. 
A c c e p t a n c e a n d r e c e i p t of g o o d s . 
It is a question for jury to determine whether 
or not defendant is to be deemed to have 
accepted the goods by his failure to reject them 
within a reasonable time. Lauer v. Richmond 
Coop Mercantile Inst.. 8 Utah 305, 31 P. 397 
(1892) (decided under former law). 
Either words or conduct may be sufficient to 
show acceptance of goods although the infer-
ence to be drawn from either should be clear 
and unequivocal. J ames Mack Co. v. Bear River 
Milling Co . 63 Utah 565, 227 P. 1033, 36 A.L.R. 
643 (1924) (decided under former law). 
Manual and actual receipt of the goods is not 
required; symbolic, constructive, or implied 
possession is sufficient. Hudson Furn. Co. v. 
Freed Furn. & Carpet Co., 10 Utah 31, 36 P. 132 
(1894) (decided under former law). 
A d m i s s i o n of c o n t r a c t ' s e x i s t e n c e . 
Admission by party to a transaction between 
a merchant and a nonmerchant that he would 
have consideied himself bound by their oral 
agreement if he had received confirmation of it 
within a reasonable time did not bring into 
operation the provisions of Subsection (3Kb) 
and validate the otherwise unenforceable 
agreement. Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 
<Utah 1976). 
Sta tute of frauds generally, Chapter 5 of Title 
25. 
Applicat ion. 
Where buyer was in possession of wheat as 
bailee and after oral contract for sale thereof 
was entered into he requested extension of time 
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of 
s ta tute of frauds. J a m e s Mack Co. v. Bear River 
Milling Co., 63 Utah 565, 227 P. 1033, 36 A.L.R. 
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uni-
form Commercial Code). 
Because amount involved in oral contract for 
sale of turkey poults was in excess of $500, plea 
of s ta tu te of frauds precluded its enforcement. 
Tanner v. Childers. 108 Utah 455, 160 P.2d 965 
(1945) (decided under former law). 
" B e t w e e n m e r c h a n t s " e x c e p t i o n . 
Since a farmer, party to a transaction with a 
grain dealer, was not a "merchant" within the 
meaning of this section, Subsection (2) did not 
apply and the s ta tu te of frauds rendered unen-
forceable an oral agreement to sell the farmer's 
whole wheat crop, valued substantially in ex-
cess of $500. Lish v. Compton, 547 P.2d 223 
(Utah 1976). 
Where buyer was in possession of wheat as 
bailee and after oral contract for sale theieof 
was entered into he requested extension of time 
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of 
s ta tute of frauds. J ames Mack Co. v. Bear River 
Milling Co., 63 Utah 565, 227 P. 1033, 36 A.L.R. 
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uni-
form Commercial Code). 
C o n f i r m a t o r y m e m o r a n d u m , 
Where two elephant merchants agreed over 
the telephone to the sale and purchase of the 
animal "Peggy," and buyer sent seller a letter 
confirming the terms of the sale agreement, the 
s ta tute of frauds was satisfied, since it did not 
appear that seller had objected to the memo-
randum in writing. Miller v. Kaye, 545 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1975). 
Contract for work. 
Oral agreement whereby company agreed to 
build auto trailer for use in business by cash 
register salesman was not a sale but a contract 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch . 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decis is . panels of tha t court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involv- R2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of s tate agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the s 'a te or other local agencies; and 
(ii; a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any mat ter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enac ted by L. 
1986, ch . 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch . 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2 »< h) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k) 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted Boaid of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4) 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
ANAI YSIS 
Decisionb of Boaid of Pardons 
Extraordinary writs 
Final urder 
Habeas coipus proceedings 
Post-corn iction review 
Scope 
— Sentence reduction 
Cited 
Dec i s ions of Board of Pardons . 
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, ex-
cept v. hen the petition additionally challenges 
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree 
felon\ or a capital felony Then the appeal is to 
be heard by the Supreme Court Preece v 
Hou*e, 886 P2d 508 (Utah 1994) 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestiy actions le vie wed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resouices" for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2)(a) 
The 1996 amendment by ch 159, effective 
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sover-
eign Lands and Forestiy" in Subsection (2)(a) 
The 1996 amendment by ch 198, effective 
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d), 
listing appeals from circuit couits, and redesig-
nated foimer Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as 
(2)(djto(2)(j) 
This section is set out as leconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Reseat ch and General 
Counsel 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of militaiy court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16 
Extraordinary writs. 
The Couit of Appeals had jurisdiction over a 
petition for a writ of mandamus dnected 
against a judge of the district court based on its 
authority under this section to enforce compli-
ance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid 
of its appellate jurisdiction Barnard v Murphy, 
882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds noth-
ing to the Supreme Court's writ jui isdiction — 
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing 
from the jurisdiction of the Couit of Appeals — 
because jurisdiction over petitions foi extraor-
dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's juris-
diction to consider a petition ongmally filed 
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that originated el&ewhere Barnard 
v Murphy, 882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
Because, under this section, the Court of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Rule 3 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 436 
TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction 
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise 
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court 
within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step 
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity nf 
the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions 
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docket-
ing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon 
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of 
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appel-
lant, such name shall be added to the title. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996.) 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
 t r i a l j o r filing 0f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § ^255 
2 6 C . j ! s S - 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f
 Ff™ to * v e » o t i c e °ff a P P I i c a t i o n *>r de" 
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- fault >»****£ ^%\T\TJB r e q m r e d o n l y 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d b v custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.LR3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facta aa would be admiaaible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
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there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compi l e r ' s Notes . • 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
- This rule is similar to Cross -References . — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
—Wills. 
Judicial at t i tude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of t rust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Employee status. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
—Proximate cause. 
—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 
Written statement of grounds. 
Cited. 
Affidavit 
—Contents. 
Specific facts are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial . Reagan Out-
door Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 
(Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). 
Affidavits submitted by plaintiff tha t con-
10 UOO BEPORTINO SERVICE 
bility of unconscionability, and the necessity for a hearing is then )>y 
obviated. 
Having established that the semiconductors sold to Macarr wrm 
not warranted for merchantability and fitness, the third-party de-
fendant is entitled to a dismissal of the third-party complaint. Set Ho 
judgment. 
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. v. PIKE 
Arkansas Supreme Court, February 15, 1971, rehearing denied 
May 10, 1971 
249 Ark 1026, 466 SW2d 901 
HI 1201, fl 2316] Conspicuousnees of disclaimer of warranties. 
Disclaimer clause in warranty of a truck was ineffective to disclaim implied 
warranties since it was not conspicuous, in that it was printed in small, nariowly 
spaced type. In addition, there was evidence that the warranty was deli\ • HI<1 
to buyer some time after the sale was made, constituting a unilateral att< mpl 
of the seller to limit its obligations. 
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hot Spring County. 
BROWN, Justice. Appellee Earl Pike obtained judgment for per-
sonal injuries and property damage against International Harvester 
Company and its Malvern distributor, Burks Motors, Inc., as a result 
of a mechanical failure of appellee's International transport truck, 
which failure substantially wrecked the transport and caused serious 
injuries to appellee. This appeal is by International, in which sev-
eral points for reversal are submitted and to which we shall later 
refer. . . . 
Since the case must be reversed because of the errors wo h.ive 
discussed, we shall touch only on those remaining points of appellant 
which are likely to arise upon retrial. 
8. The court erred in giving instructions and submitting in-
terrogatories to the jury pertaining to breach of warranty. The 
trial court, by appropriate instructions and an interrogatory, sub-
mitted the issue of implied warranty of merchantability. The trial 
court refused to submit the question of express warranty, apparent ly 
for the reason that the warranty had, according to its terms, e\-
1164 
10 UOO REPORTING SERVICE 
pired. The third paragraph of the written warranty has the dis-
claimer provision: 
"This warranty is in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied, 
including without limitation, warranties of MERCHANTABILITY and 
FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE, all other representations to 
the original purchaser, and all other obligations or liabilities, including 
liability for incidental and consequential damages, on the part of the 
Company or the seller. No person is authorized to give any other war-
ranties or to assume any other liability on the Company's behalf un-
less made or assumed in writing by the Company, and no person is 
authorized to give any warranties or to assume any liabilities on the 
seller's behalf unless made or assumed in writing by the seller." 
With the exception of what we have reproduced in caps the 
remainder of the lettering is smaller than the type appearing on 
this page, and the lines are narrowly spaced. We cannot classify 
it as being conspicuous, which is one of the requirements of a 
disclaimer. Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark 152, 
437 SW2d 784 [6 UCC Rep 100] (1969); Mack Trucks v. Jet 
Asphalt, 246 Ark 101, 437 SW2d 459 [6 UCC Rep 93] (1969). 
Furthermore, there was substantial evidence that the warranty 
was delivered to appellee some time after the sale was made, con-
stituting "a unilateral attempt of a party to limit its obligations." 
Mack Trucks v. Jet Asphalt, supra. The court was correct in sub-
mitting the issue of implied warranty. 
Reversed and remanded. 
HARRIS, C. J., and HOLT, J., are of the opinion that the trial 
court was correct in refusing to submit to the jury the issue of 
appellee's negligence. 
REISSMAN INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. J. S. O. WOOD 
PRODUCTS, INC. 
New York Civil Court, Now York County 
New York Law Journal, June 6, 1972, p 2 
[1f 2104, If 2201] Statute of frauds. 
A contract for the sale of goods for a price in excess of $500 was enforceable 
whore the purchaser sent the seller a signed purchase order, both parties were 
merchants, and the seller made no objection within ten days after receipt of 
the order. 
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CTJ2201] Statute of frauds—effect of admission of existence of contract. 
An action to recover damages for defendant's alleged failure to deliver good i 
covered by a purchase order will not be dismissed on motion, even 1 hough th«» 
purchase order was not signed, where discovery proceedings have not been 
had, since it is possible that plaintiff either through discovery or at the trml 
may obtain an admission from defendant that a contract was made, which 
under 5 2-201 (3) (b) would render the contract enforceable to the extent of th<» 
quantity of goods admitted. Compelled testimony may be treated as an ad-
mission under § 2-201(3)(b). 
UCC Sections Cited: §2-104(1), 8 2-201(1), (2), (3)(b). 
EVANS, J. In this motion for damages sustained by reason of 
defendant's failure to deliver 144 cabinets out of a total of 250 
ordered, under two purchase orders, defendant moves for sum-
mary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that then* 
is no writing signed by the defendant and therefore claims that 
the action is barred by the Statute of Frauds UCC § 2-201. 
Defendant also counterclaims for $1,764 representing the un-
paid balance of 63 cabinets, and a delivery charge. 
The documents submitted by plaintiff in* opposition to the motion 
consist, in pertinent part, of two purchase orders which wore sou! 
to defendant. The first, No. 71-131 for 50 cabinets is signed by 
the plaintiff; the second, No. 71-132 for 200 cabinets, is unsigned. 
With respect to the purchase order 71-131, the statute has been 
satisfied. Sub-paragraph (2) provides that "Between merchants 
if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the con-
tract and sufficient against the sender is received and the parly 
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the re-
quirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written 
notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after 
it is received." Both parties are merchants, UCC §2-104(1) and 
the purchase order was signed by the sender and no objection 
thereto was made by defendant within the ten day period allowed 
by the statute. 
The second purchase order, No. 71-132 for 200 units sent by 
plaintiff to defendant, presents further problems. It was unsigned, 
and defendant denies that there was such a contract. UCC § 2-20) 
(3) (b) provides that a contract, itself not sufficient because it 
was not signed, is enforceable "if the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought admits in his pleadings, testimony or otherwise in 
court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is nol 
enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods ad-
mitted." 
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Although defendant, in his answer, has denied the existence of 
the contract alleged by plaintiff, the affidavits submitted show that 
one invoice sent by defendant to plaintiff, refers to purchase order 
No. 71-132, although the invoice is limited to 42 cabinets. Whether 
or not plaintiff may, through the use of discovery proceedings after 
answer obtain a testimonial admission of the alleged contract from 
defendant has not yet been passed upon in New York (see Weiss 
v. Wolin, 20 Misc2d 750). This court concludes that it may, and 
therefore the portion of the motion seeking a dismissal of the 
complaint is denied at this time. _ 
Although one respected commentator has stated that such com-
pelled testimony is not to be regarded as an admission, (see Ander-
son, Uniform Commercial Code, 2d Ed §2-201:45, p 281), the au-
thority cited by him for that proposition states that lawyers and 
judges are not in agreement on that point. Hawkland, Sales and 
Bulk Sales, 1958 p 31. The various reports of the Law Revision 
Commission show that it considered that the required admissions 
might be compelled; see 1953 Law Revision Commission Report, 
Recommendations and Studies, 65 "O", p 17, 18 and its J 955 Study 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, at p 371. 
In its 1957 Report, at p 23 the commission states that the 1953 
proposal would include admissions by way of pleadings, bills of 
particulars, depositions, affidavits, admissions pursuant to notices 
to admit, and oral testimony, and its 1960 report at page 271 
states "In the 1957 revision of the Code the 1952 version was changed 
to provide that the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity 
of goods admitted and to make it clear that it applied to admissions 
on cross-examination." 
The Statute of Frauds, designed to [prevent] perjurious proof 
of an oral contract, has had ambiguous treatment by the courts. 
Some have held that the requirement of a writing was an indis-
pensable formality and a substantive requirement rendering an oral 
contract entirely void; others have created exceptions where justice 
required. 
The limitations have been questioned, since the purpose of the 
statute is fully satisfied if the defendant admits, in the particular 
action, the making of the contract as claimed by plaintiff (see 
Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 Cornell Law Quarterly, 
1952 p 355). Other jurisdictions have reached this conclusion. In 
Cohn v. Fisher, NJ Supreme Ct, Jan. 24, 1972, 10 UCC Rep 
372, not yet otherwise reported, the court reaching this 
conclusion under the Uniform Commercial Code, said, "The statute 
was not designed to protect a party who made an oral contract, 
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but rather to aid a par ty who did not make a contract, though 
one is claimed to have been orally made for him". (See also, Gar-
rison v. Piatt, 113 Ga App 94, 147 SE2d 374 [3 UCC Rep 296] I960; 
In re Particle Reduction Corp., USDCED Penna, Jan. 10, 1908, 
Bankruptcy No. 29817; 60 Berks LJ 65, 5 UCC Rep 242). 
This motion was brought on prior to any discovery proceeding *. 
The possibility exists that plaintiff there or on trial may be able 
to obtain an admission by defendant of the entire contract as 
claimed. 
Plaintiff has not opposed defendant's motion for judgment on 
its counterclaim, except as to the price per cabinet, which is the sole 
issue remaining as to the counterclaim. That issue should be tried 
together with the plaintiff's claim. The motion for summary judg-
ment dismissing the complaint, and for judgment on the counterclaim 
is accordingly denied. 
BRIDGEWATER WASHED SAND & STONE CO., INC. v. 
BRIDGEWATER MATERIALS, I N C 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, May 15, 1972 
282 NE2d 912 
[1J 2201] Statute of frauds. 
Where a written contract for the sale of land and certain materials thereon 
and an oral agreement explaining some of the language and terms of the writl-n 
agreement were breached by the seller's failure to turn over to the buyer sonio 
of the materials, the whole agreement was enforceable against the seller under 
§ 2-201 since the seller had received the full consideration from the buyer. 
UCC Section Cited: § 2-201(1), (3)(c). 
Before TAURO, C. J., CUTTER, SPIEGEL, REARDON and HENNESSEY, 
JJ. 
James D. St. Clair for the defendants. 
Harold Rosenwald for the plaintiff. 
CUTTER, J. The plaintiff (the buyer) seeks to recover from the 
corporate defendant (Materials) the value of stockpiled sand and 
gravel or stone removed from three parcels of land sold (except 
for part of one parcel on which there was an asphalt plant) by 
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Materials to Gerald I. Bern or his nominee. The buyer became 
Bern's nominee. An agreement of purchase and sale (the original 
agreement) was executed on May 24, 1965.2 A supplementary agree-
ment, dated June 21, 1965, defined by metes and bounds the land 
to be excepted from the conveyance (the excepted parcel) and 
created certain easements in favor of the buyer as lo the excepted 
parcel. Lorusso, Materials' president and treasurer (In 1), signed 
each agreement individually as well as for Materials. An auditor, 
who made findings described below, assessed damages, recoverable 
by the buyer, at $50,150. Subject to the defendants' exceptions, 
a Superior Court judge denied their motion to recommit the auditor's 
report, and allowed a motion for judgment for tho buyer on the 
auditor's report. The case is before us on the defendants' bills of 
exceptions. 
The land sold consisted of about seventy acres in Bridgewater. 
The excepted parcel contained about 6.2 acres. The original agree-
ment (par 2) provided that the "sale . . . shall include the sand 
and gravel plant . . . on the [soldj premises, all equipment listed 
. . . and processed and unprocessed sand and gravel." It further 
provided (par 3) , after referring to the excepted parcel, "Any 
sand and gravel removed from this area at any time after passing 
of papers, and any sand, gravel or stone stockpiled in this area 
at the time of passing of papers shall be the property of the 
[b]uyer, and the [b]uyer shall have the right to enter the area 
to remove it for a reasonable . . . t ime" (emphasis supplied). The 
supplementary agreement of June 21, 1965 (probably executed on 
June 22) , made a similar provision, in terms clearly applicable to 
the excepted parcel.3 Materials and Lorusso apparently assume that 
papers passed on June 22, 1965, although this is by no means wholly 
clear from the auditor's report. 
The parties stipulated before the auditor that the original agree-
ment and the supplementary agreement "constitute the written 
agreements between the parties." From oral testimony of "wit-
nesses for . . . the plaintiff [the buyer] and the defendants [i. e. 
Materials and Lorusso] . . . attorneys and . . . accountants who 
2
 The auditor referred in various places to this date as May 21, but it was 
agreed at the arguments that the correct date was May 24. In quoting the 
auditor's report, this correction has been made. 
3
 The supplementary agreement provided (par 5) "that the purchase price 
was allocated by the parties as follows: $100,000 for the land; $70,000 for the 
building; and $10,000 for the stockpiles." The auditor found that these 
allocations were not "an expression of the accurate value of . . . [the] in-
ventory . . . or . . . stockpiles but" represented figures "insisted upon by . . . 
[Materials and Lorusso] for tax purposes." 
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